In everyday life, most of us hold no doubt that we are creatures of free will. You read this book because you deliberately bought it, or someone gifted it to you, and because I wrote it with intent. Can I claim, without attracting your ridicule, that as a writer I was more an agent than an author? Can I assert, without making you dismiss this book, that you are unaware of countless factors outside your conscious will that led this book into your hands? In fact such claims are not untenable, and with ever-new information from neuroscience, they are turning increasingly compelling.
In examining the debate on free will, one comes across technical terms like determinism, compatibilism and libertarianism. We will understand each of them, commencing with determinism. Determinism is an important concept, because it gives rise to the entire debate. The key philosophical problem at hand is whether a deterministic universe rules out the concept of free will. The necessary moral quandary is how to hold individuals morally responsible if there is no free will. A deterministic universe is one where any given event can be construed as the cause of previously instantiated factors, or causal events. One thing leads to another in this universe, much like the movement of billiard balls on the table after a shot is made. The striking of the cue to the white ball in billiards is akin to the Big Bang of our universe, which set in motion the chain of causality that leads to you reading these words now. This in short is the deterministic notion, and it holds that everything has a sufficient cause, which in turn is defined as the set of conditions needed to ensure that the event in question takes place.
We can see why viewing things as deterministic rules out free will as we understand it, which is that human beings are capable of acting freely or to their own choosing. Anything we do is the result of a particular critical path that begins with the Big Bang and ends, in this case, at the thing we do. That critical path contains factors that have nothing to do with our choosing but are still essential for our choice to instantiate. The path includes the transformation of hydrogen to helium in the sun, the successful reproduction by millions of generations of creatures including your parents and grandparents, the evolution by natural selection that turned this line from cell to sapien, the particular school you went to, the teachers and friends that influenced you, the habits you formed and the affect they had on you and your body, and more.
Determinism also implies that the given state of the universe at any moment, when completely considered, can describe a future state of the universe. Further, if we knew these conditions and possessed the required computational power, we could predict the future. Both these things also rule out the concept of free will, for if a supercomputer could predict the future what real choice do any of us have? Buddhism and Hinduism agree with science here, and Swami Vivekananda wrote that the law of nature is governed by desha-kala-nimitta, or space, time and causality. Nothing, he said, worked outside the bounds of desha-kala-nimitta, including the self. Some find comfort from the common notion that quantum physics rules out determinism. In the quantum world, cause and effect do not have the linear relationship they have in the atomic world. Instantaneous events are known to occur, and weird things happen like an effect instantiating before the required cause is triggered. In his book A New Science of Life, Rupert Sheldrake proposes the morphic resonance theory, which says that information can flow back from future events to those in the past or the present. This is another way of saying that the relationship between cause and effect is not linear or one-way.
But when we use gaps in contemporary models of physics to fill in with woo-woo, we tend to forget that we do not live in the quantum universe. We live in the atomic universe. And for there to be any plausible extrapolation on free will from the quantum universe, we would have to draw connections between consciousness and quantum physics that are unfalsifiable at best. It is always a suspicious thing when the mathematical models formulated by physicists are misappropriated by new-age gurus. It is easy to describe consciousness as a field much like magnetic and gravitational fields. A fine writer or orator could do so most compellingly, and it would be hard for us not to be swayed. But our rational tethers must await the description of a consciousness field that is as vivid and falsifiable as that of a magnetic field. The objective of this digression is to remind us that the unpredictable aspect of quantum physics does not rule out a deterministic universe, and if we are to find place for free will in it we cannot resort to redefinitions of consciousness or determinism.
A deterministic universe is further supported by the Einsteinian model of spacetime, which we have previously discussed. To revise in brief, this model reminds us that time is not a separate force in the universe, it is but the fourth dimension in spacetime. Recall the explanation given by Max Tegmark, that reality is not space with time in motion, it is in fact static spacetime. The future exists as much as the past, and the right way to look at these is like we look at ‘forward’ and ‘backward’, not ‘before’ and ‘after.’ As an analogy, imagine splashing a can of paint on the wall. Seconds after you do so, the paint spatter is imprinted onto the wall. Such is the case with the universe as well. All of the past, present and future instantiated at the moment of the Big Bang itself, and our experience of time is an illusion brought on by our consciousness- which in turn has been wired by millions of years of evolution to help us navigate reality. In a universe where the future already exists, free will is necessarily precluded.
The above is a summary of the deterministic view of the universe, which in philosophical circles is termed as ‘hard’ determinism because it denies the idea of free will. On another point of the spectrum are thinkers like Daniel Dennett, who are termed compatibilists. Compatibilism is the assertion that a deterministic universe does not rule out free will. Understanding this is important, because it is easy to think that compatibilism denies a deterministic universe. It does not. It denies a particular inference of the deterministic universe- that free will cannot exist in it. Compatibilists are often accused of using semantics as a shield in the free will debate. A compatibilist gets away with asserting free will in a deterministic universe by redefining the very concept of free will. But as we will see, this view of free will goes beyond mere wordplay.
In other words, the compatibilist does not say that we have free will because the universe is not deterministic. The compatibilist says that we have free will if and because the social order is not imposing. To a compatibilist, if you steal from someone without a gun at your head forcing you to do so, you have free will. To a determinist, the internal motives that lead you to steal even without external factors are themselves the product of a deterministic universe. Another way of saying this is that the compatibilist asserts that you have free will because she knows that you have free won’t. You are always free not to do something (provided no one is holding a gun to your head), and the fact that you do it even when you had the option not to is the supporting argument for free will.
As mentioned before, some view the compatibilist stance as a semantic game, because it argues for free will after redefining free will itself. Even the compatibilist is forced to confess that the origins of an individual’s internal and unforced motives are unexplained. The deterministic steps in here and asserts that these unexplained origins can be attributed to the deterministic universe. The difference is well illustrated in this quote from Arthur Schopenhauer:
“Man can do what he wills, but he cannot will what he wills.”
The compatibilist is someone who argues for the first part of the above quote, the determinist is someone who insists that the second part of the quote is the critical factor. We all possess the illusion of free will, and thus we certainly can do what we will. But none of us can explain the origin of our will except through deterministic factors in our and the universe’s past. This is why compatibilism is also called ‘soft determinism.’ It does not deny the reality of determinism, it simply redefines free will to make it compatible with a deterministic reality. A soft determinist agrees that human behaviour is determined by causal events, but still insists that as long as a human acts to her nature, free will exists. You could certainly choose what side to take in this debate, the only caveat being that you must realise that the debate is not on whether the science on determinism is true or not. The debate is on whether we can define free will in a way that we could sleep comfortably at night. Also, since we know that the universe is indeed deterministic, the only way to accommodate free will is by redefining it.
To explain the compatibilist view further, let us look at the split that a determinist relies on. A determinist insists that the consciousness of a human being is divided into what she is conscious of on one side and the array of internal neurological processes she is unconscious of on the other side. The determinist says that while the part we are conscious of does experience the illusion of free will, not all our neurological processes are under our consciousness or our control. When these neurological processes make us act this way or that, they are an agent of determinism. The compatibilist sees this as unnecessary confusion. She reminds us that we are not only our consciousness but also all our bodily functions and neurological processes. Why limit the definition of ‘me’ to only the ‘me’ that I’m conscious of? Thus, when a particular sequence of neurological discharges makes me feel this way or that, it is still me feeling this way or that. I am still acting only of my own accord. Thus, I have free will.
In this representation, I can only hope that the ‘compatibilism’ is evident. It’s driven home further when the compatibilist confesses that of course we do not have contra-causal free will, or free will that exists outside of causal factors. In his booklet Free Will, Sam Harris is right to call this line of argumentation as a bait-and-switch. But while our battle with compatibilists is over semantics, the battle with libertarianism is far tougher. The libertarian view denies the deterministic universe, which even the compatibilist knows to be scientifically true. Things quickly get murky and vague in the libertarian world, which in this context is summarised as the view that humans are free of determinism, thus making it a direct refutation of scientific reality. There are different elaborations on this idea, not all of them in agreement with each other. It is thus difficult to provide generalised views of libertarianism. But we will discuss it in more detail in the coming chapter, because what it does here is help us see the primary reason why people are unable to accept determinism in their lives- they take it far too seriously.
The tendency is to think that, since the world works deterministically, it must mean we are automatons. It must mean we have absolutely no control over the decisions we take, and if we were but replaced by a robot in the same circumstances it would do exactly as we do. The extreme position to take is of defeatist fatalism. But the truth is in the details. Saying that free will does not exist is not the same as saying that the illusion of free will does not exist. We’ve previously examined the idea that reality might be a simulation, but this speculation does not detract from the living, breathing and pulsating experience of life that we all undergo. Similarly, a deterministic world is at the same time a world pulsating with the illusion of free will. The feeling you have of being in control of your thoughts and actions is a real feeling, and none can deny that you have it. Even if you take a fatalist interpretation of determinism and argue that you might as well sit at home and do nothing since nothing is in your control, you still arrive at the decision through the same deterministic factors that affect everything else.
In a scientific worldview, we do not frame our concepts of reality based on what we feel. If what we feel, or what we are conscious of, becomes the framework for reality, we would never learn about our own bodies. For do you feel your cells at work? Do you feel your neurons firing? Can you perceive the levels of serotonin or dopamine in your body at any given time, or regulate them at will? In a very true sense, as Carl Sagan said, we are all made of stardust. But do you feel stardust inside you? Empirically, there are several ways to illustrate that free will is an illusion. The problem is not in proving it. The problem is in the discussions that must inevitably follow, and the problem is why the free will debate is important in the Cultural Universe. The problem is why compatibilists and libertarians do not accept the full implications of determinism- If we do not have free will, what is morality? How can we punish someone for any crime if we assert that there is no such thing as free will? Should a rapist be let go scot free, because he does not have free will? Should a paedophile be forgiven? How can any legal punishment be valid when science shows that humans do not have free will? The free will debate is thus not a scientific problem, where the debate is settled. It is a moral problem.
These difficult questions are why we must understand free will better in this chapter, for in the following chapter we dive into morality, law and justice in greater detail. But this is the important thing to remember- how individuals and communities should behave in a deterministic universe is a valid question, and also irrelevant in a discussion on whether free will exists or not. The question of how humans should behave has no bearing on the fabric of reality, nor on natural laws. It has a bearing only on human beings, and on nature to the extent that human beings can affect it. In other words, the moral quandaries that a deterministic universe throws up for homo sapiens do not in themselves affect the universe. This is why hard determinists get frustrated with compatibilists and libertarians. In the former case, it’s because compatibilists indulge in word-play and side-stepping while acknowledging the undeniable truth. In the latter case, it’s because libertarians are in denial of scientific realities only to accommodate their views of morality and human freedom. In fact, it’s the determinist who seeks the ultimate compatibilism- the formulation of moral codes in acknowledgment of a deterministic universe.
It wouldn’t have escaped the keen reader’s notice that we asserted that it is possible to prove that free will does not exist, without actually proving it. To that aim, let us begin by asking ourselves some questions. The idea here is two-fold. We are going to see how the universe is deterministic (the position of both determinists and compatibilists), and how the nature of the human mind precludes any free will (where compatibilists and libertarians collude in denial).
- If you so willed, could you right now teleport to a different location, instantly? Could you do so as easy as you walk or breathe? (Answers like ‘I can do this when teleportation is invented’ are at best compatibilist and at worst, evading the actual debate.)
- If you so willed, could you right now jump off a high-floor window and rise up in the air, instead of being subject to earthly gravity? (Without any additional flying mechanism, whether it’s a jetpack or biological modifications done in a lab.)
- If you so willed, could you wake up one day earning 20% more than you did the previous day, through sheer will alone? (As opposed to achieving the same after a year of hard work or boss-appeasement.)
- If you so willed, could you murder anyone who annoys you with no repercussions whatsoever? (Without having to go into hiding or taking other steps to avoid the legal and social ramifications.)
Cases 1 and 2 illustrate how the physical order imposes limits on what we can or cannot do. Cases 3 and 4 illustrate how the social order imposes limits on what we can or cannot do (or at least mandates consequences that we would have willed away were it so in our power). Those with an enhanced understanding of the debate on free will might find these examples to be absurd and even beside the point, but I’ve found that looking at this through the absurd lens allows us to show how any assertion that free will exists must in any case define free will within a physically and socially bounded code. The proof is sealed by a simple mental experiment any of us can conduct. The experiment requires us to sit in quietude and observe the flow of our own thoughts. This will take some getting used to, as the mind’s tendency is to cling to a random flicker of thought and dive into flights of fantasy chasing that line. To observe the flow of our thoughts is different to being lost in them, and to do the former requires conscious control. Put this book aside for a moment and run the experiment. To establish an initial tether, it helps to direct our focus to the flow of breath in and out of our lungs. Even as you do this, you will catch your mind lost in thought. Make a note of how easy it was for your mind to wander and return your attention to the breathing. When you feel you’ve established some measure of control, shift your focus to the incessant tide of thoughts in your mind.
When you’ve done this, ask yourself- who or what drives this incessant tide? The experiment clearly reveals that you are at the tide’s receiving end. Thoughts arise in your mind and you become conscious of them. You do not exist in any real or metaphorical way at the origin of these thoughts. You are not behind them, pushing them forward. You are in front of them, receiving them as they arise. And if it’s not you driving them, what is? Science tells us that the tide is driven by your neurology, which in turn exists in a deterministic universe.
In his book Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow, Yuval Noah Harari explains this through a simple algorithm. He begins by defining the brain as the centre of all neurological processes, discharges and impulses, and defining the mind separately as a seat of consciousness. Is the mind within the brain, or does it exist outside it? If it lies within the brain, then it is obviously a product of the same neurology- which in turn is subject to the deterministic universe. Thus the mind and consciousness are also subject to determinism. But if the mind exists outside it, where is this place? This is the question that anyone must answer if they are to include free will in their framework for reality.
Perhaps you had a good life, wholesome nourishment, financial success and loving people for family and friends. Perhaps your uncle raped you when you were nine years old. Perhaps your father was alcoholic and routinely abused you and your mother. Perhaps your mother was a prostitute, and before you knew it you were in the business too. Perhaps your friends in high school introduced you to heroin, and your life is a history of failed rehabilitation attempts. Perhaps your father bequeathed a billion-dollar corporate empire to you, or perhaps he gave it to your younger brother because you had the wrong body parts. Perhaps you were born to a family with a proud history of sending sons to the military, and you followed suit. Perhaps you were none of these and something else altogether, and perhaps everyone you know is none of these, all of these and also something else altogether. In every case, countless physical, social and legal factors converge at every moment of choice, every moment of decision making. At this convergence point, are you an agent that considers all these factors, computes to negate the bad ones and enhance the good ones, and makes the right decision moment to moment? Or are you, in every single moment, but the very event that instantiates at the convergence of all these factors? Making your mind up on this is important before we move onto the issue of morality, and it is difficult precisely because the deterministic universe has irrefutably ruled out the traditional notion of free will.
The point is driven home by a series of compelling experiments held since the 1980s. In 1985, physiologist Benjamin Libet’s experiments demonstrated that several seconds before a decision was consciously made by subjects, it was manifested in the activation of the brain’s motor cortex. This reconfirmed a discovery made in 1964 that the electric potential of a physical action (such as flexing a finger) is detectable in the brain much before it is actually made. To Libet himself the experiment did not rule out free will. He argued that subjects still had the option to veto a decision in the time that it fired in their motor cortex and the time they took it. This idea is often represented as free won’t, and we will shortly explore it in greater detail.
A similar experiment run in 2011 by neuroscientist John-Dylan Haynes led him to conclude- “Libet’s and our findings do address one specific intuition regarding free will, that is, the naïve folk psychological intuition that at the time when we make a decision, the outcome of this decision is free in the sense of not being predetermined by prior brain activity.” To understand this in terms we’ve defined, the hard deterministic stance insists that this prior brain activity is the basis for our actions. And since it is a result of determinism, there is no free will. In contrast, soft determinists or compatibilists argue that the prior brain activity still belongs to us. We are both our conscious awareness and our sub-conscious neurology. In that sense, they say, we have free will. At the very least, we have free won’t. Experiments such as these show that with the right settings and measurements, neuroscientists can often predict their subject’s choices before the subjects make them. As Michael Shermer says in his book, The Moral Arc- “If these results don’t bother you, then you’re not thinking hard enough about them.”
The natural question then is this- how do we accept a deterministic universe while still finding room for moral responsibility? In turn, this addresses larger questions in the meaning of life, the universe and everything- is there such a thing as morality? Is there meaning to human life, and is it headed anywhere purposeful? Shermer himself suggests four ways around the problem. Let us visit each in detail:
- Modular Mind – This argument involves defining an individual as not just her conscious neurology, but also the network that exists below her level of awareness. Even if a decision arises below awareness, it is still the same person who acts on it. This makes the individual solely responsible for her actions, and thus morally responsible as well. The idea of a modular mind is supported by the understanding that the human brain exists in a constant state of neural conflicts. At any given situation there is competition between opposing modules in our brain, such as the module for altruism vs. the module for selfishness.
- Free Won’t – This idea builds upon the concept of a modular mind. Since the human brain is a network of competing impulses, free will is exercised as the veto of one impulse in favour of another. Free won’t argues that we all possess the capacity to reject a particular action arising from our unconscious neurology. The idea is not without experimental support. In 2007, Marcel Brass and Patrick Haggard’s study on subject choices where the choices could be changed at the last moment led them to conclude- “Our results suggest that the human brain network for intentional action includes a control structure for self-initiated inhibition or withholding of intended actions.”
This is defined as free won’t, and in exercising it an individual exercises her conscious will. This allows us to hold her responsible for her actions, which are the choices she did not reject among several arising from unconscious impulses. The study also revealed that the more one learns to supress one’s impulses, the better one can supress impulses in the future. The mind can, through conscious effort, be trained to be mindful of its choices.
- Probabilistic Causality – This framework argues that a degree of free will has evolved in us naturally. The universe is deterministic, but natural selection has shaped the human mind to weigh several competing choices before taking an action. This arose because our ancestors, over millions of years, flourished by constantly considering multiple options for survival and reproduction. Living in this way means that modern homo sapiens possess highly evolved cognitive traits. Complex neural circuitry allows us many behavioural options arising out of unconscious impulses. An evolved emotionality informs us on right and wrong choices. And a theory of mind allows us to be aware of others and think what they’re thinking about. In his book Freedom Evolves, Daniel Dennett argues that free will arises through these cognitive traits, since they make us weigh the consequences of the many courses of action that determinism makes available to us at any given moment. Because we are aware that others also make these choices, we hold them and ourselves accountable.
- Degrees of Moral Freedom – Building on the previous three frameworks, the idea of degrees of freedom in morality suggests we assess people based on their capacity to properly weigh their impulses before acting on one. The concept defines morality not in binary terms of right and wrong, but as a spectrum with outright psychopaths on one end and spiritual past masters on the other. Under this framework, we evaluate how capable an individual was of making the right choice given the circumstance. This circumstance in turn is the sum of educational, filial, societal, political, economic and other deterministic factors. Together they make one individual more or less capable of weighing her actions, and we identify her degree of free will in that measure. This allows us to hold the average, well-functioning citizen morally responsible and lends itself to decisions on morality, law and justice.
When summing up, Shermer asserts that we have free will because our modular minds have many competing neural networks that are still us in every sense, which allows us to make choices through exercising our veto power over a range of choices that are part of the brain’s causal net, and the net gives individuals varying degrees of moral freedom. Like Shermer in his book, this is the definition of free will we will keep in mind as we explore the ideas of morality, law and justice.